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I
INTRODUCTION

If any one be in danger of receiving a buffet, or the like evil, some hold that he has a
right to protect himself by killing his enemy. If merely corrective justice be regarded, I
do not dissent. For though a buffet and death are very unequal, yet he who is about to
do me an injury, thereby gives me a Right, that is a moral claim against him, in
infinitum, so far as I cannot otherwise repel the evil. And even benevolence per se
does not appear to bind us to the advantage of him who does us wrong. But the
Gospel law has made every such act unlawful: for Christ commands us to take a buffet,
rather than hurt our adversary; how much less may we kill him? ... Hence it appears
also that that is wrong which is delivered by most writers, that defense with slaying is
lawful, that is by Divine law (for I do not dispute that it is by Natural Law,) when flight
without danger is possible: namely, because flight is ignominious, especially in a man
of noble family. In truth there is, then, no ignominy, but a false opinion of ignominy,
to be despised by those who follow virtue and wisdom....
On the Rights of War and Peace
Hugo Grotius

A traveler on a dark road is set upon by an armed stranger. The stranger's
assault threatens death or atrocious physical harm. The traveler pulls out a
knife or a gun and kills the assailant. Has the traveler done something
wrong-or, more precisely, something for which the legal system should
punish him or her? Most contemporary Americans, faced with the facts
above, would likely say that the traveler has killed in self-defense and thus has
committed no crime. Further, most would likely perceive the scene described
above as an easy case. H. L. A. Hart writes, "Killing in self-defence is an
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exception to a general rule making killing punishable; it is admitted because
the policy or aims which in general justify the punishment of killing (for
example, protection of human life) do not include cases such as this." 1
But easy cases may make bad law. Two problems arise in the analysis of
the uncomplicated narrative above. First, the very ease of the case conceals a
contradiction: If "protection of human life" is a paramount goal of the
criminal law, the incident on the highway, so far from falling outside the
policy, must fall squarely within its purview. An act of violence has been
committed, human life has been taken by another human being, and a legal
system sincerely concerned with protecting human life should explain the
exception in more rigorous terms than Hart admits. The case above seems
easy to contemporary thinkers only because considerable historical grappling
has been done by the legal system over half a millennium.
Second, the case cited above, in its very archetypicality, has the potential
to distort legal analysis of actual cases. Available evidence suggests that most
killings, even those in which the killer successfully pleads self-defense, are not
of the "pure" variety cited above, in which an unknown assailant begins an
unprovoked assault on a surprised victim. Instead, the majority of homicides
take place after ambiguous confrontations between persons who know each
other and have a history of involvement and conflict. 2 The criminal justice

system must assess the culpability of the survivor and decide what, if any,
atonement is to be exacted for the act of killing. This complex investigation is
powerfully shaped, and often distorted, by the belief of those in the system
that they are comparing the actual case before them with the archetype cited
above. Our "intuition" about the "easy case," which is in fact a historically
shaped perception about a troubling moral dilemma, leads us to view actual
events as instances of that case. If there were different "easy cases"
available-for example, the now forgotten archetype of "chance-medley"
from the common law 3-the outcome might often be different.
One aspect of the doctrine of self-defense has proved unusually
problematic for theoreticians and courts. What if the traveler, menaced by
the stranger's assault, could escape by dashing into a nearby house and
closing a sturdy oaken door? To what extent should the law, if satisfied that
the opportunity existed and that the traveler knew of it, penalize the traveler
for using deadly force instead of running away?
1. H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays inthe Philosophy of Law 13 (Oxford U Press,
rev ed 1978) (emphasis added).
2. According to official crime reports, "[o]ver half the murder victims in 1989 were related to
(15%) or acquainted with (39%) their assailants. Thirteen percent of the victims were murdered by
strangers, while the relationships among victims and offenders were unknown for 33% of the
murders." Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports for
the United States 12 (1989). These same figures show that 35% of murders in 1989 arose out of
arguments, while another 4% grew out of "brawls while offenders were under the influence of
alcohol or narcotics." Id at 13. At most, 22% of murders were committed during felonies. Id at 12.
These figures remained roughly stable from 1985 to 1989, although felonies, on average, accounted
for less than 20% of murders. Id at 13.
3. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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The law's answer to this is most authoritatively stated by the Model Penal
Code!The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor
believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily
injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it
justifiable if ... the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with
complete safety by retreating ...

except that . . . the actor is not obliged to retreat

from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in
his place of work by another person whose place of work the actor knows it to be.... 4

But at the time they adopted the "retreat rule," the drafters of the Code
recognized that "American jurisdictions [are] divided on the question ... with
the preponderant position favoring the right to stand one's ground." 5 In fact,
the "retreat rule" has spawned a strong argument-one that has attained the
status of law in many jurisdictions-for the contrary rule, a rule of "no

retreat."
Proponents of both rules face difficulty in even formulating the rules they
favor, and even greater problems in applying them. This is so, at least partly,
because of the tangled historical origins of the law of self-defense.
Contemporary criminal law attempts to justify morally a number of doctrinal
contradictions that arise because the contemporary law of self-defense
represents the uneasy yoking together of principles that arose at different
times and for different reasons. 6 They also arise because the distinctions set
up by the law-between the "initial aggressor" and the "innocent victim," for
example-are in practice unusually hard to make when dealing with actual
deadly conflict between real people.
The roots of the retreat rule lie in the distinction made by the medieval
legal mind between justifiable and excusable homicide. Contemporary law
does not recognize a practical difference between these two categories, but in
the early common law they had significantly different elements and practical
effects.

Questions ofjustification and excuse concern the level of responsibility of
criminal defendants for the actions with which they are charged. The moral
and legal ramifications of responsibility formed the core of a symposium
published in Law and Contemporary Problems in 1986. 7 This note constitutes
further research into the topic of justification and excuse examined in that
issue in an exchange between Professors Kent Greenawalt and Donald
8
Horowitz.
Professor Greenawalt argues that a justified action is "warranted" and
"morally appropriate," while an excusable action is merely "not
4.
5.
6.

Model Penal Code 3.04(2)(b) (American Law Inst, 1985).
Model Penal Code commentaries 3.04(c) (American Law Inst, 1962).
See part II.

7. Responsibility, 49 L & Contemp Probs (Summer 1986) (Martin P. Golding, special editor).
8. Kent Greenawah, DistinguishingJustificationsfrom Excuses, 49 L & Contemp Probs 89 (Summer
1986); Donald L. Horowitz,Justification and Excuse in the Program of the Ciminial Law, 49 L & Contemp
Probs 109 (Summer 1986).
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blameworthy" because the person who commits it is not "fully responsible." 9
He further argues that unlike moral philosophy, the law "ought not attefinpt to
delineate bright-line distinctions between justifications and excuses."' 0
"Legal categorization must usually be responsive to facts discoverable in the
legal process," he argues. "One reason, for example, not to require retreat
even if the actor knows he can retreat with perfect safety is that it is so difficult
for an outsider to appraise whether the actor realized that retreat would be
safe."'" Professor Greenawalt concludes that the game is not worth the
candle: "A scholar may well be able to develop a comprehensive distinction
between legal justification and legal excuse, but he should not expect the
necessarily crude materials of statutes and opinions to endorse that
distinction." 12
Professor Horowitz responded to Professor Greenawalt's moral analysis of
the distinction with a historical review of its origins.' 3 Because of their
disparate historical origins, he argues, excuse relates largely to whether the
defendant had free will, while justification relates to whether a defendant had
a social status or authority that permitted him or her to commit the challenged
action. Professor Horowitz argues that, "[i]t is important to keep straight
4
what is excused and what is justified.'
This note elaborates upon this difference of opinion as it relates to the
issue of retreat and self-defense. Of the two perspectives, I am more in
agreement with Professor Horowitz. The law could profitably use finer
distinctions, and the line between justification and excuse would be far more
useful if it were clearer. To explore the issues raised by the question of
retreat, this note will examine the evolution of the "retreat rule," from its
origins in the medieval common law of England through contemporary
applications of it and its twin in the decisions of American courts. For the sake
of focus, the inquiry will center purely on the issue of the duty to retreat.
Equally important questions-such as the possibility of an exception to the
duty when a person is attacked in his or her dwelling, and the extremely
controversial "co-tenant" exception to this "castle doctrine"-will of
necessity be slighted in the present inquiry. 15
9. Greenawalt, 49 L & Contemp Probs at 91 (cited in note 8).
10. Id at 99.
11. Id.
12. Id at 108.
13. Horowitz, 49 L & Contemp Probs 109 (cited in note 8).
14. Id at 120.
15. For a highly critical feminist analysis of the "castle doctrine" and "co-tenant exception," see
Cynthia K. Gillespie,JustifiableHomicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law 77-87 (Ohio State U
Press, 1989). Gillespie sees both as an expression of pervasive patriarchal and misogynistic thought.
The current inquiry is not conducted along feminist lines, but is not intended to slight the
importance of the issues she raises.
Academic comment on self-defense and retreat generally is less profuse than one might expect.
The classic article on this subject is Joseph H. Beale Jr., Retreat From a Murderous Assault, 16 Harv L
Rev 567 (1903), advancing an unusual interpretation of the historical common-law rule of selfdefense, critiquing the 19th-century leading cases, and advocating stricter adherence to the commonlaw rule of retreat. Beale's article is critiqued in Rollin M. Perkins, Self-Defense Re-Examined, I UCLA L
Rev 133, 139-44 (1954). The legal literature on this subject also includes A. J. Ashworth, Self Defence
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Part II will discuss the historical roots of the retreat rule as formulated in
the common law of England. Part III will show how the rule was modified in
the United States during the nineteenth century, drawing on leading cases to
illustrate the roots of the American rule of "no retreat." Part IV will
particularize the interpretive strategies American courts have evolved in their
application of the new American jurisprudence, then illustrate these strategies
by analyzing selected cases in three court systems: the United States Supreme
Court, which adopted the "no retreat" rule in 189516 but has been ambivalent
in its subsequent applications of the rule; Alabama, which adopted the retreat
rule from the common law in 184717 and has remained officially faithful to it
ever since, elaborating upon its meaning in an unusually rich jurisprudence;
and Illinois, which in 1902 followed the lead of the Supreme Court in
adopting the American rule of "no retreat"1 8 and has consistently been
counted as a "no retreat" jurisdiction ever since. The conclusion will
tentatively suggest specific reforms to contemporary jurisprudence of retreat
and self-defense.
II
ROOTS OF THE RETREAT RULE

Saxon law was a rough and ready construct, which treated homicide in
open quarrel" as a matter to be resolved by the payment of damages and
fines.' 9 The closest analogue of our crime of murder was the secret killing of
an enemy by poison or witchcraft, which was punished by delivering the
20
malefactor to the victim's family.
But by the thirteenth century, a more complex jurisprudence of homicide
was in place, including a fully developed differentiation between justifiable
and excusable homicide. Justifiable homicide was the killing of a human being
in furtherance of royal justice. This category included the execution of a felon
sentenced to death or of "an outlaw or hand-having thief or other manifest
and the Right to Life, 34 Camb LJ 282, 293-96 (1975); Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regardfor
Rights in the CriminalLaw, 64 Cal L Rev 871 (1976); and George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law,
§ 10.5.4 at 864-75 (Little, Brown & Co., 1978). In addition, Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in
the Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 Stan L Rev 591 (1981), while not concerned specifically with the issues
of self-defense, is an invaluable guide to the strategies courts use to interpret issues in criminal cases.
Shortly before this note was published, Professor Richard Maxwell Brown of the University of
Oregon published No Duty to Retreat. Violence and Values in American History and Society (Oxford U Press,
1991). Brown, a social historian, traces the evolution of the American rule of "no retreat" from
Blackstone, see id at 3, to the Bernhard Goetz case, id at 174-75. Brown's book is an invaluable
resource for any reader interested in the theme of this note or in the larger questions about violence
and society it is intended to raise.
16. Beard v United States, 158 US 550 (1895).
17. Pierson v State, 12 Ala 149 (1847).
18. Hammond v People, 199 Il1 173, 64 NE 980, 983 (1902).
19. Frederick Pollock & Frederick W. Maitland, I The History of English Law' before the Time of
Edward 52 (Cambridge U Press, 2d ed 1923).
20. Id at 52-53.
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felon who resists capture." 2' In opposition to this class of homicide was
killing "by misadventure or in self-defence." 2 2 A defendant who killed to save
his own life would be convicted and sentenced to death, and would then be
required to apply to the king for a pardon. Historical records suggest that
such a pardon was routinely given-but that even when it was, the defendant
23
was required to forfeit his chattels.
An offense not clearly covered by either doctrine was the killing of a
housebreaker by the householder. This ambiguity was clarified in the
sixteenth century by a statute moving these killings, in effect, into the group
24
of those committing justifiable homicide.
The distinction, both conceptually and in practical effect, between
justifiable homicide and killing in self-defense continued in English law until
the eighteenth century. Blackstone, in 1769, set forth the requirement that
"the law must require [the killing], otherwise it is not justifiable.- 2 5 The
26
classic example of such a requirement, again, is a lawful sentence of death.
No killing by private citizens is justifiable unless it is done "for the prevention
of any forcible and atrocious crime," 2 7 because, he explained, "the one
universal principle that runs through our own and all other laws seems to be
this-that where a crime, in itself capital, is endeavored to be committed by
28
force, it is lawful to repel that force by the death of the party attempting."
Against that class of homicides, Blackstone grouped "excusable homicide,
the very name whereof imports some fault, some error or omission." 2 9 This
class of killing fell into "two sorts: either per infortunium, by misadventure, or
se defendendo, upon a principle of self-preservation. " ' 30 The latter type of
killing is "that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault or the like,
21. Pollock & Maitland, 2 History of English Law at 478 (cited in note 19). The term "handhaving" is a modernization of "handhabend," a Saxon law designation for a thief who had not yet
disposed of or hidden the stolen goods. Black's Law Dictionary 644 (West, 5th ed 1979).
22. Pollock & Maitland, 2 History of English Law at 479 (cited in note 19).
23. Id at 481.
That a man who kills another in self-defence should require a pardon will seem to us even
more monstrous than that pardons should be needed where there has been misadventure,
for the 'misadventure' of this age covers many a blameworthy act. But the author of the
Leges Henrici, if we read him rightly, would demand a wer [fine] from the self-defender....
Id at 483 (footnote omitted). See also note 41 and accompanying text.
24. [1]f any person or persons, at any time hereafter, be indicted or appealed of for the
death of any such evil disposed person or persons attempting to murder, rob, or burglarily
to break mansion-houses, as is abovesaid, that the person or persons so indicted or
appealed thereof, and of the same by verdict so found and tried, shall not forfeit or lose any
lands, tenements, goods or chattels, for the death of any such evil disposed person in such
manner slain, but shall be thereof, and for the same fully acquitted and discharged, in like
manner as the same person or persons should be if he or they were lawfully acquitted of the
death of such evil disposed person or persons.
24 Henry VIII, ch 5 (1532), quoted in Perkins, I UCLA L Rev at 138 (cited in note 15).
25. William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Law of England *178 (Welsh & Co., W. Lewis ed
1902) (emphasis in original).
26. Id.
27. Id at *180.
28. Id at*181.
29. Id at *182.
30. Id.
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in the course of a sudden broil or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him." 3 '
A conflict of this sort was called "chance-medley." 32 Blackstone explains that
the term "[i]s properly applied to such killing as happens in self-defence upon
a sudden encounter." 33 Because the right of self-defense (as opposed to the
right to execute the King's justice) did not include the right of attacking, "to
excuse homicide by the plea of self-defence, it must appear that the slayer had
no other possible (or at least probable) means of escaping from his
assailant." 34 If the quarrel was a case of mutual combat, then the defendant
must either not have begun the fight, or, if he did, must have attempted to
decline further struggle. 3 5 And "[t]he party assaulted must therefore flee as
far as he conveniently can, either by reason or some wall, ditch, or other
36
impediment, or as far as the fierceness of the assault will permit him."
Blackstone's explanation of the different treatment of the two offenses was
that
the law sets so high a value upon the life of a man that it always intends some
misbehavior in the person who takes it away, unless by the command or express
permission of the law. [T]he law intends that the quarrel or assault arose from some

unknown wrong, or some provocation, either in word or deed; and since, in quarrels,
both parties may be, and usually are, in some fault, and it scarce can be tried who was
originally in the wrong, the law will not hold the survivor entirely guiltless .... The
law, besides, may have a further view: to make the crime of homicide more odious,

and to caution men how they venture to kill another upon their own private judgment,
by ordaining that he who slays his neighbor, without an3express
warrant from the law
7
so to do, shall in no case be absolutely free from guilt.

Chance-medley was at the heart of the common law interpretive scheme of
homicide. Dating from at least the fifteenth century, the word means "a
casual killing of a man, not altogether without the killer's fault, though
without an evil intent." 3 8 Because homicide in self-defense rarely arises
without fault on both sides, the courts would not fully balance rights and
wrongs; instead, the killer would be given the opportunity to show, first, that
he acted in furtherance of justice by killing a "manifest felon" who was
engaged in a capital crime against him (which would produce an acquittal as
justifiable homicide) or, failing that, that he killed in reasonable defense of his
own life on a quarrel, however begun, so long as (1) he did not
unambiguously begin it himself and (2) he retreated as far as he could before
using deadly force (which would produce a conviction, a pardon, and a
forfeiture or fine as chance-medley). As Sir Matthew Hale explained,
for though in cases of hostility between two nations it is a reproach and piece of

cowardice to fly from an enemy, yet in cases of assaults and affrays between subjects
under the same law, the law owns not any such point of honour, because the king and
31.

Id at 184.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.

Id.
Id.
ld at "185.
Id at *187.
3 Oxford English Dictionary 13 (Oxford U Press, 2d ed 1989).
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his laws are to be the vindices injuriarum,
and private persons are not trusted to take
39
capital revenge one of another.

This rationale was compressed into a series of relatively rigid rules, which
Hale summarized in 1678:
Homicide, Excusable Se Defendendo, which though it save the life, yet the Goods are
forfeited; this requires these things: 1. It must be an inevitable necessity. In case of a
justifiable Homicide, as of a Thief that comes to rob me, or by an officer resisted in
Executing an Arrest, the Party need not give back to the Wall. But in this Homicide se
defendendo, the Party that is assaulted is not excused, unless he give back to the Wall.
But if the assault be so fierce, and40in such a place that giving back would endanger his
life, then he need not give back.

More than a century later, Edward East noted that the practice of
forfeiture had been abandoned, and that even though "the party killing is not
altogether free from blame ... it has been more frequent ...
' '4
direct a verdict of acquittal. '

for the court to

The common-law doctrine of homicide can be analyzed as giving the king,
and through him the law, a proprietary right in the use of deadly force against
his subjects. Justifiable killing was only that done by express or implied order
of the king. It was lawful for a subject to execute another subject by the king's
command; and execution was the paradigm against which all other acts of
homicide were measured. If a subject killed another to prevent an obvious
felony, which was by definition a capital offense, then he had killed only in a
kind of execution. 42 But Blackstone's analysis suggests that in cases of mutual
quarrel, where the assailant and the defender were known to each other, the
common law considered that only rarely would the fault be all on one side,
and that the administrative difficulty of finding those few cases outweighed the
benefits.
A quick reading of a few contemporary cases of self-defense 43 suggests
that this is a highly useful analysis indeed. But as the common law moved into
the New World, the courts began to discard it.
39. Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 481 (0. Lynch, 1778), quoted in Beale, 16 Harv
L Rev at 574 (cited in note 15). The Latin phrase means "the protector against wrong."
40.

Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown: A Methodical Summary 41 (Professional Books, Ltd, P. R.

Glazebrook ed 1972) (written in 1678).
41. Edward H. East, 1 Pleas of the Crown 220 (Professional Books Ltd, P.R. Glazebrook ed 1972)
(written in 1803).
42. The "manifest felony" doctrine allowed a large area for interpretive maneuver by courts and
juries, who could interpret one assault as a "mere (that is, non-felonious) assault" and another as a
manifestly "murderous (that is, felonious) attack." Nonetheless, the word "manifest" at least set up
an objective standard. In the 19th century, this objective standard was replaced with a subjective
one, in which the "felonious attack" exception to the retreat rule was triggered if a court decided the
attack was made with "felonious intent"--a subjective inquiry that obviously allowed more room for
interpretation. See, for example, note 61 and accompanying text.
43. See, for example, Rowe v United States, 164 US 546, (1896), discussed at notes 92-100 and
accompanying text. The only close substitute for chance-medley at present in most jurisdictions is
voluntary manslaughter, which represents a "catch-all category which includes homicides which are
not bad enough to be murder but which are too bad to be no crime whatever." Wayne K. LaFave &
Austin W. Scott, Criminal Law § 7.9 at 652 (West, 2d ed 1986). Voluntary manslaughter is usually
defined as intentional killing while "in a state of passion engendered . . . by an adequate
provocation." Id. Chance-medley need not entail any showing of passion, however, and may involve
a defendant who made a quite rational decision to kill in defense of his or her own life. Faced with a
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III
THE DOCTRINE IN THE NEW WORLD

The duty to retreat, and leave the law to vindicate injuries, fit poorly into a
political ideology that saw individuals as possessing natural rights, including
the right to violent recourse even against the state if it exceeded the bounds
allotted to it by political theory. In addition, chance-medley, with its
implication of mixed fault, was difficult to harmonize with nineteenth-century
doctrines of individualism. Accordingly, post-revolutionary American courts
began to weave their interpretive nets more finely in order to find one party at
fault and the other faultless.
In 1855, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled a trial judge who had
instructed the jury in orthodox terms about the difference between justifiable
and excusable homicide. The judge had further instructed that "[i]f [the
defendant] could have retreated and did not, in the opinion of the Court, this
44
is not justifiable homicide."
Haynes had been convicted of shooting a neighbor during a quarrel about
the water from a well adjoining their property. In Blackstone's analysis, it
seemed a classic example of chance-medley, in which the defendant could not
be acquitted unless he was not at fault and had attempted to retreat. But in
setting aside the conviction, the state Supreme Court recast the question in
terms of property rights. "[I]nstead of charging the Jury that Haynes was
bound to retreat as far as he could in safety, we think they should have been
instructed 'to inquire, first, as to the right of Haynes to the enjoyment of the

well in common with [the deceased]

....

'

"-45 The concept of fault in the

encounter, too, was recast in terms of precise legal rights and obligations:
"The slayer, too, must be faultless; he must owe no duty to the deceased; be
under no obligation of law to make his own safety a secondary object;
otherwise, he is answerable to the law of the land, without any immunity
46
under the shield of necessity."
Twenty-one years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed a
conviction of manslaughter in which the trial judge had ruled that there was
no construction of the facts by which the jury could have found that the
defendant acted in self-defense. 4 7 The defendant, George Dixon, kept a
country store in his house. One Sunday morning, while the store was
crowded with customers, he decided to attend church and ordered the
customers to leave. When the crowd did not disperse fast enough to suit him,
defendant they do not wish to convict of murder or acquit altogether, of course, many juries are
likely to eschew careful parsing of the elements of the offense and settle on a verdict of manslaughter
as a compromise. Unlike killing by chance-medley, of course, manslaughter is not a pardonable
crime, but entails a criminal sentence. Many of the appeals considered below are from convictions of
voluntary manslaughter.
44. Haynes v State, 17 Ga 465, 473 (1855).
45. Id at 483.
46. Id at 484 (emphasis in original).
47. Slate v Dixon, 75 NC 275 (1876).
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got a club
Dixon shoved the deceased toward the door. The deceased 4 then
8
and advanced on the defendant, who shot him with a pistol.

Here was an even clearer case of chance-medley: the defendant admitted
being the initial assailant, provoking the quarrel not with words but with an
actual assault. The deceased had been invited implicitly into the 'store, and
was attempting to leave when the incident occurred. But the court used the
defendant's property right in the store as the grounds for holding that he had
not provoked the incident in a way that would have triggered the common-law
duty of retreat:
Was the prisoner himself without fault? That depends upon several
considerations. Did the prisoner use more force than was necessary to remove the
deceased from his house? He had ordered the crowd out as many as seven or eight
times, and they "moved slowly." Was this from sullenness and on purpose? If so, the
prisoner had the right to use the necessary means of enforcing compliance with his
[ 49 1
orders. Was the deceased 'shoved' at all? The witnesses do not agree as to that.
But if he was, what was the character of the shove? Was it in a rude, angry or insulting
assault or battery and put the prisoner in fault? These
manner, so as to constitute it5 an
0
were questions for the jury.

Faced with a common law rule requiring that the defendant be faultless, or
at least not the first assailant, the court redefined the defendant's act in such a
way that its violent or provocative character vanished. Here, the shove is not
actually a shove unless delivered in a "rude, angry or insulting manner."
With the shove out of the way, the court went on to explain, the case would
then have been changed into one of felonious assault by the deceased, and
thus ofjustifiable homicide, with no obligation to retreat: "where the attack is
made with murderous intent, the person attacked is under no obligation to fly;
he may stand his ground and kill his adversary, if need be." 5 1
Also in 1876, the Ohio Supreme Court extended the logic of Haynes in a
decision that became the leading American case on the right to stand one's
ground. 5 2 Erwin shot his son-in-law, who was also his tenant; the occasion
was a long-standing dispute over the use of a tool-shed "[b]etween their
houses, but not within the curtilage of either." 53 The deceased threw the
defendant's tools out of the shed. When the defendant broke open the locks
and entered, the deceased approached the shed with an axe, disregarding the
54
The
defendant's warnings. The defendant killed him with a pistol.
48. Id at 277.
49. A rather generous construction of the testimony. In fact, one witness had not seen a shove.
None testified, according to the record, that there had actually not been one. Id.
50. Id at 278.
51. Id at 279. Note the subjective test of "murderous intent," which has by now been replaced
in most decisions by the common-law objective test of "manifest felony." The court distinguished
murderous assaults from those in which the assailant had no intent to kill. In the latter case, the
defendant might respond with force, but might not kill his attacker. Id.
52. Erwin v State, 29 Ohio St 186, 192-200 (1876). At the same time, courts in many jurisdictions
continued to affirm the old common law analysis of excusable and justifiable homicide and to affirm
the duty of retreat in cases of self-defense. See, for example, Pond v People, 8 Mich 149 (1860), for a
particularly good explanation of the rule of retreat as applied in 19th-century American law.
53. Erwin, 29 Ohio St at 192.
54. Id at 192-93.
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defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree after the trial court
instructed the jury that the defendant could use deadly force to protect
himself,
provided he use all means in his power otherwise to save his own life or to prevent the
intended harm; such as retreating as far as he can, or disabling his adversary, without
killing him, if it be in his power. But if the attack upon him is so sudden, fierce, and
violent, that a retreat would 5not
diminish, but increase, his danger, he may kill his
5
adversary without retreating.

The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the instruction was in error:
The question, then, is simply this: Does the law hold a man who is violently and
feloniously assaulted responsible for having brought such necessity upon himself, on
the sole ground that he failed to fly from his assailant when he might have safely done
so? The law, out of tenderness for human life and the frailties of human nature, will
not permit the taking of it to repel a mere trespass, or even to save life, where the
assault is provoked; but a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an
assailant, who, by violence
or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him
56
enormous bodily harm.

The doctrine of Erwin marked the complete disappearance of the concept
of chance-medley from American jurisprudence. Under the emerging
American rule, every case of self-defense was now adjudged by the standard
of the encounter between a "true man" and an unprovoked assailant, with the
"duty" to retreat assessed after the case had been thus measured. Similar
reasoning prevailed in a Mississippi case in 1876, 5 7 in which the conviction
was reversed in part because the court had instructed the jury that the
defendant had the duty to retreat. No such duty existed, the appellate court
asserted, even though the defendant had engaged in a long-running quarrel
with the deceased, had borrowed a pistol, and had gone behind the building
with the deceased for the apparent purpose of settling their differences.
Because the deceased had been physically advancing toward the defendant at
55. Id at 193.
56. Id at 199-200. The Erwin court's "true man" formulation has become the most famous
statement of the American rule of no retreat, and was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in
Beard v United States, 158 US 550, 560-61 (1895), see notes 81-83 and accompanying text. It is
important to put it in context, as the locution is antique and confusing to contemporary ears.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that terminological confusion may have permitted the court in
Erwin to reach the result it did. Cynthia Gillespie lampoons the "true man" doctrine as embodying
"nineteenth-century hairy-chestedness," on the apparent assumption that a "true man" is a brave or
manly one. Gillespie, justifiable Homicide at 80 (cited in note 15). Richard Maxwell Brown, who has
written a particularly useful account of the circumstances surrounding Erwin, see Brown, No Duty to
Retreat at 8-10 (cited in note 15), also finds the phrase a comic repetition of an "innocuous" phrase
used by Hale. Id at 9. He suggests that the Erwin court assumed that "there was, or should be, no
other kind." Id at 10. But the term "true man" historically, from whatever source the Erwin court
derived it, does not refer to courage but to freedom from legal fault. Like the phrase "good men and
true" to describe those eligible to serve on juries, the term "true man" dates to the 13th century as a
term for men not themselves guilty of felony: "an honest man (as distinguished from a thief or other
criminal)." 8 Oxford English Dictionary 608 (Oxford U Press, 2d ed 1989). It is in this sense that
Shakespeare's SirJohn Falstaff says of the robber Gadshill, "[t]his is the most omnipotent villain that
ever cried 'Stand!' to a true man." William Shakespeare, 1 Henry IV, I, ii, 109. The term thus takes
us back to the first half of the common-law dichotomy between justification and excuse: An innocent
citizen assaulted by a manifest felon, being "true," might kill without retreating. But a person who
had engaged in chance-medley was not considered to be true. See note 37 and accompanying text.
Thus the Erwin court had, knowingly or not, elided the key distinction in the case before it.
57. Long v State, 52 Miss 23 (1876).
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the precise moment he was shot, the court held, the defendant had no duty to
retreat: 58
Flight is a mode of escaping danger to which a party is not bound to resort, so long as
he is in a place where he has a right to be, and is neither engaged in an unlawful
enterprise, nor the provoker of, nor the aggressor in, the combat. In such case he may
by force, taking care that his resistance be not
stand his ground and resist force
59
disproportioned to the attack.

A year later, the Supreme Court of Indiana recognized that American
jurisprudence had not simply interpreted the common-law rules on selfdefense, but altered them:
[tihe tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against the
enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee when assailed, to avoid
chastisement or even to save human life, and that tendency is well illustrated by the
recent decisions of our courts, bearing on the general subject of the right of selfdefence. The weight of modern authority, in our judgment, establishes the doctrine,
that, when a person, being without fault and in a place where he has a right to be, is
violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel force by force, and if, in the
60
reasonable exercise of his right of self-defence, his assailant is killed, he is justifiable.

The common-law view of violence as the property of the state had been
replaced by a new, highly ambiguous standard in which violence was the right
of all citizens if used "without fault" and "in a place where they had a right to
be." The idea of chance-medley, with its implications of mixed fault ("fault in
the air," so to speak 61 ) had been replaced by a new, highly personalized view
of fault, in which either victim or aggressor was implicitly held to be
responsible for all the violence. These ambiguous standards were to prove
singularly elusive in application.
IV
THE RULES IN SELECTED AMERICAN COURTS
A.

Interpretations of Retreat:

A Strategic Taxonomy

Adjudication of self-defense cases involves appellate courts in a complex
exercise in interpretation. Violence and danger seem to be largely subjective
matters in these adjudications. It is, however, possible to identify a number of
interpretive strategies the courts use. These may be briefly summarized as
follows.
1. Rewriting the Facts. Acts of violence
provocative, while non-violent provocations
The courts manipulate the "fault" standard
the encounter on either the victim or the

may be interpreted as nonmay be interpreted as violent.
to place the fault for beginning
defendant. In cases where the

58. This interpretive strategy is of a kind discussed by Kelman, 33 Stan L Rev 591 (cited in note
15), under two headings: broad and narrow time-framings, id at 593-94, and broad and narrow views
of intent, id at 595-96.
59. Long, 52 Miss at 35.
60. Runyan v State, 57 Ind 80, 84 (1877). A full discussion of the background to this case is to be
found in Brown, No Duty to Retreat at 10-17 (cited in note 15).
61. Paraphrasing Palsgrofv Long Island RR, 248 NY 339, 162 NE 99 (1928).
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defendant is given a new trial, the rule that the party invoking self-defense
must be without fault is read narrowly. One such narrow reading is the "first
assailant" rule: the "without fault" doctrine, which might ascribe fault to a
defendant who behaved in a provocative way, is instead changed to state that
the defendant must simply not strike the first blow. 62 If the defendant did in

fact strike the first blow, the act of violence is interpreted as non-violent, or
63
the victim's non-violent provocation is recharacterized as violent.
Retreat courts are more likely to ascribe more violent behavior and
intention to a party who actually threatens another with a gun. 64 Conversely,
"no retreat" courts are more likely to deny the defendant the right to stand if
the victim was not armed and the defendant was. 65 The reluctance of the
courts to require retreat in the face of a gun is more reasonably based than
66
many features of this area of law.

2. Mind-Reading. Subjective inquiries about the defendant's state of mind
may be used to characterize objective physical actions. Since self-defense
cannot be invoked without a "reasonable belief" that it is necessary, courts
may approve or void a plea of self-defense by interpreting events to reveal the
defendant's subjective state of mind. Thus, defendants who appear on the
face of the record to have been in some apparent danger can be held not to
have perceived sufficient danger, 6 7 while other defendants who are actually
68
relatively safe can be held to have been reasonablyfearful of harm.
62.

See, for example, People v Taylor, 3 Ill App 3d 734, 279 NE2d 143 (1972). The defendant,

who killed a bartender during a brawl that followed the bartender's attempt to expel him from the
bar, did not need to retreat, even though he had entered the bar, displayed a pistol, and threatened a
patron, because he was "not the first assailant." 3 Ill App 3d at 737, 279 NE2d at 145.
63. See, for example, note 96 and accompanying text.
64. See, for example, notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
65. See, for example, People v Millet, 60 Ill App2d 22, 208 NE2d 670 (1965). The defendant,
who was standing in the street without cover, was denied a new trial after conviction for shooting a
man who threatened to kill him and reached into his trunk as if to obtain a weapon. The defendant
had a gun, and, after his death, the victim was found to be holding only a jack. 60 I1 App2d at 27,
208 NE2d at 673.
66. The doctrine of "retreat to the wall" had its origin before the general introduction of
guns. Justice demands that its application have due regard to the present general use and to
the type of firearms. It would be good sense for the law to require, in many cases, an
attempt to escape from a hand to hand encounter with fists, clubs, and even knives, as a
condition ofjustification for killing in self-defense; while it would be rank folly to so require
when experienced men, armed with repeating rifles, face each other in an open space,
removed from shelter, with intent to kill or to do great bodily harm. What might be a
reasonable chance for escape in the one situation might in the other be certain death.
State v Gardner,96 Minn 318, 327, 104 NW 971, 975 (1905). It is, however, important not to confuse
an intelligible rationale for one rule or the other for a judicial commitment to the rule so justified. In
fact, Gardner, which is one of the cases most cited by academic commentators, is largely an orphan
case in its own jurisdiction. See State v Astin, 332 NW2d 21, 24-25 (Minn 1983) (restricting Gardner
holding to its particular facts and affirming general duty to retreat). Gardner is discussed in Brown,
No Duty to Retreat at 17-20 (cited in note 15).
67. In Millet, the court denied a new trial because "the fear experienced by defendant was not so
great that defendant could take the life of another." 60 Il1 App2d at 30, 208 NE2d at 675.
68. See, for example, notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
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3. Stopping the Clock. Broad and narrow time-frames may be used as
needed. If a total reading of the circumstances suggests that a defendant was
at least partially at fault in provoking the encounter, then the court may focus
on the few minutes or seconds before the fatal encounter. 6 9 Conversely, the
court may reach back to events-threats or physical attacks by the deceased or
to the instant case-to reinterpret the event in
even by third parties unrelated
70
a radically different light.
4. Flip-Floppingthe Rule. The rule of the jurisdiction may be held to contain
the opposite rule. If necessary, a requirement of retreat can be found subject
to the "manifest felony" or "murderous intent" exception. 7 ' Similarly, in "no
retreat" jurisdictions, the fact that a defendant did not retreat may simply be
"noted" for consideration, while the court insists that it is in no way
derogating from the general rule that there is no duty to retreat. 72 The next
two subsections consider these strategies as they have been used by the
United States Supreme Court and by the courts of Alabama (formally
committed to the "retreat rule") and Illinois (formally committed to the rule
of "no retreat").
B.

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Doctrine of Retreat

A penniless orphan, one of three brothers, was given a cow, the last
property of his dead mother, and sent to live with his uncle, who took the cow
as his own as a condition of taking in his nephew. A few years later, the
orphan decided to leave his adopted home and, with the help of his brothers,
to reclaim the cow, which the uncle refused to give up. 7 3 Will Jones, the
orphan's older brother, died in the argument that ensued, struck over the
head with a shotgun by his uncle Beard, who became the defendant in the
74
leading case on self-defense to come before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Beard testified that he chased the Jones brothers off his farm and told
them that they could take the cow only if a court so ruled. 75 Nevertheless,
they returned that afternoon and began to lead the cow away. While Mrs.
Beard was attempting to drive the cow back into its pasture, Beard arrived,
"having with him a shotgun that he was in the habit of carrying when absent
from home." The fatal confrontation took place about fifty or sixty yards
from his farmhouse. When Will Jones moved toward Beard "with an angry
69. See, for example, notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
70. See, for example, note 139 and accompanying text.
71. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text. For an example, see also note 129 and
accompanying text.
72. See, for example, notes 148 and 157 and accompanying text.
73. Beard v United States, 158 US 550 (1895).
74. Id at 550-51. The case arose in federal rather than state court because it took place in
Indian country in Arkansas. All the parties were white. Id at 962. Beard remains good law today, and
was cited by Justice Powell as recently as 1977. See Martin v Ohio, 480 US 228, 243 (1977) (Powell
dissenting). The social background of the Indian Territory cases on retreat is set out in Brown, No
Duty to Retreat at 28-30 (cited in note 15).
75. Beard, 158 US at 552.
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manner and in a brisk walk," Beard warned him to stop. 7 6 Will Jones
continued toward him, cursing and "at the same time making a movement
with his left hand as if to draw a pistol." ' 77 Beard hit him across the head with
78
the shotgun. Jones died soon thereafter.
Beard testified of his careful mental processes before striking Jones:

Believing... from his demonstrations just mentioned that he intended to shoot me, I
struck him over the head with my gun, to prevent him killing me.... I then at once
jumped over the fence, caught WillJones by the lapel of the coat, turned him rather to
one side, and pulled his left hand out of his pocket. He had a pistol, which I found in
his pocket, grasped in his left hand, and I pulled his pistol and his left hand out
together. My purpose in doing this was to disarm him, to prevent him from shooting
me, as I did not know how badly he was hurt. My gun was loaded, having ten
cartridges in the magazine. I could have shot him, but did not want to kill him,
him down with the gun, and disarm him, and protect
believing that I could knock 79
myself without shooting him.

Beard was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Western District of Arkansas. The judge told the jury:
[W]as the defendant called upon to avoid [any] danger [from Will Jones] by getting
out of the way of it if he could? The court says he was. The court tells you that he was.
There is but one place where he need not retreat any further, where he need not go
away from the danger, and that is in his dwelling house. . . . [I]f a man, while so
situated, and upon his own premises, can do that which would reasonably put aside
the danger short of taking life, he can do that, I say, he is called upon to do so by
retreating .... 80

Beard appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court reversed his conviction.
In his opinion, Justice Harlan in effect decided the case twice. In his first
holding, Harlan wrote,
[W]e cannot agree that the accused was under any greater obligation when on his own
premises, near his dwelling house, to retreat or run away from his assailant, than he
would have been if attacked within his dwelling house. The accused, being where he
had a right to be, on his own premises, constituting a part of his residence and home,
at the time the deceased approached him in a threatening manner, and not having by
language or by conduct provoked the deceased to assault him, the question for the
jury was whether, without fleeing from his adversary, he had, at the moment he struck
the deceased, reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith believed, that he could
not save his life or protect himself from great bodily harm except by doing what he
did .... 81

The opinion then proceeds through a lengthy exposition of the evolving

American law of retreat, citing many of the cases discussed above 8 2 and then
restating the holding in sweeping fashion, without reference to the "castle
doctrine":
76.

Id.

77. Id at 552-53.
78. Id at 553.
79. Id. This account of a careful, almost leisurely, thought process and a completely nonmurderous intent, in the midst of a violent and angry confrontation, is an excellent example of the
ways in which the legal system encourages and rewards parties who fit the stories they tell into the
currently approved official stories.
80. Id at 555.
81. Id at 559-60.
82. Id at 565-67.
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The defendant was where he had the right to be... and if the accused did not provoke
the assault, and had at the time reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith
believed, that the deceased intended to take his life, or do him great bodily harm, he
was not obliged to retreat, nor to consider whether he could safely retreat, but was
entitled to stand his ground, and meet any attack made upon him with a deadly
weapon, in such way and with such force as, under all the circumstances, he at the
necessary to
moment honestly believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe,
83 were
save his own life, or to protect himself from great bodily injury.

This second holding, couched as it is in terms of an abstract "right to be"
in the place of confrontation rather than in specific property terms, had the
potential to expand the "castle doctrine" to encompass almost all public
space. A year later, when the Supreme Court was called upon to consider
another self-defense case, it did seem to broaden the literal holding of Beard,
84
though still keeping it tied, at least ambiguously, to a right of property.
Alberty v. United States involved a black defendant who had been a slave of a
Cherokee Indian, and who became, when freed at the end of the Civil War, a
citizen of the Cherokee nation. He had killed a man named Duncan, who,
though married to a Cherokee woman, was "the illegitimate child of a
Choctaw Indian, by a colored woman, who was not his wife, but a slave in the
85
Cherokee Nation."
Alberty had separated from his wife, who went to live at the home of a Mr.
Lipe, where Alberty worked by days. The cause of the separation appeared to
be "attentions" paid to her by Duncan. On the fatal night, Alberty took his
wife to church, then returned her to Lipe's. After she went inside, Alberty
went back to check on the stock, where, he later testified, he found Duncan at
his wife's bedroom window. Alberty testified that he accosted Duncan,
and then [he] made at me at that time. That is the first time I had seen him there. And
then I knew his voice, and he made at me as if he had something and was going to kill
me, and I had this little pistol in my pocket, and I run backwards toward the front yard,
and told him to stand off.... I started to move, and this fellow says to me, he says, "I
will kill you, God damn you," and made for me.... [S]eemed like he was going to cut
tell what it was, and I threw myself around that way
me with something. I couldn't
86
[illustrating], and fired.

Alberty was convicted of murder at a trial in which the judge instructed the
jury to acquit Alberty only if they found that he had been "so situated, so
surrounded by danger, that he could not get out of the way of it, or he could
not turn it aside by an act of less violence," and that he had "exercised
87
reasonable means.., to avoid the dreadful necessity of taking human life."
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial on the
authority of Beard.88 Although it had earlier cited Beard as authority only for
the proposition that "a man upon his own premises . . .is not obliged to
83. Id at 564. The attention paid to Beard's mental processes is an example of judicial mindreading. See part IV.A.2.
84. Albert, v United States, 162 US 499 (1896).
85. Id at 501.
86. Id at 506-07.
87. Id at 507.
88. Id.
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retreat,"8 9 it now asserted that "[t]he only difference [between Beard and
Alberty] is that in Beard the attack was made with firearms, and this case it
would appear that the defendant was about to attack him with a knife." 90
In fact, Beard had killed while on his own property; Alberty was not only
on another person's land, but far from clearly in a place where he had "a right
to be." The Court elided this property-right difference by suggesting that
Alberty was exercising his right to control access to his wife, even though she
was no longer living with him or on his premises:
We think that a man who finds another trying to obtain access to his wife's room in the

nighttime, by opening a window, may not only remonstrate with him, but may employ
such force as may be necessary to prevent his doing so; and if the other threatens to
kill him, and makes a motion as if to do so, and puts him in fear of his life or of great
bodily harm,9 he is not bound to retreat, but may use such force as is necessary to repel
the assault. '

Six months later, the Court, in Rowe v. United States,9 2 seemed explicitly to
extend the right to any public place. The victim, Frank Bozeman, was a white
man; his killer, David Rowe, was a Cherokee Indian. 93 The confrontation
between the two took place in a hotel in Pryor's Creek, Indian Territory (now
Oklahoma). Rowe entered the dining room after drinking, carrying a pistol.
Words passed between the parties and some onlookers about why Rowe
would not speak to Bozeman. "Talk Cherokee to him," someone told the
defendant, at which the victim said, "He has got too damn much nigger blood
in him to talk anything with any sense." 94 The evidence showed that the
defendant then
kicked at deceased, hitting him lightly on the lower part of the leg. That immediately
deceased sprang at defendant, striking him with a knife, and cutting him in two places
the latter drew his pistol,
on the face. That, after deceased began cutting9 defendant,
5
and fired, shooting deceased through the body.

By all accounts, including the defendant's, it was Rowe, not the victim,
who began the fatal fight by kicking Bozeman. But to Justice Harlan, the
author of Beard, the most important fact was not what Rowe did, but the
unforgivable nature of what Bozeman said. "[T]he first real provocation came
from the deceased when he used toward the accused language of an offensive
character," and "the deceased used language of an offensive character for the
purpose of provoking a difficulty with the accused, or of subjecting him to the
indignity of a personal insult." 96 Harlan argued that the defendant's
89. Id at 505.
90. Id at 507-08.
91. Id at 508. The word "remonstrate" is an example of rewriting the facts, see part IV.A.1.
The Court interprets Alberty's ambiguous challenge to Duncan, which another court might have
seen as provocation, as a resort to reasoned argument and moral suasion.
92. 164 US 546 (1896).
93. Id at 547.
94. Id.
95. Id at 547-48. Prosecution and defense agreed about the facts of the fatal tussle, except that
Rowe insisted that after kicking, "he stepped back, and leaned up against the counter, and deceased
sprang at him, and began cutting him with a knife." Id at 548. The Court later found this withdrawal
highly significant. Id at 554-55.
96. Id at 555, 554.
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testimony suggested that "he did not intend to make a violent or dangerous
personal assault upon the deceased, but only, by kicking at him or kicking him
lightly, to express his indignation at the offensive language of the
97
deceased."
Harlan held that the jury might have found that, by moving back a step and
leaning against the bar, Rowe "withdrew in good faith from further
contest." 9 8 If they did, then he was "entitled to the benefit of the principle
announced in Beard v. U.S., in which case it was said: 'The defendant was
where he had a right to be when the deceased advanced upon him ..... ,9 To
underscore the Court's apparent extension of the Beard rule to cover a public
place, Harlan repeated, "The accused was where he had a right to be, and the
law did not require him to step aside when his assailant was rapidly advancing
upon him with a deadly weapon."' 0 0
At this point, the Court seemed committed to the broadest possible
reading of the right to stand one's ground. If Rowe, after striking first in a
public place, was still entitled to an instruction as to his right not to retreat, it
was difficult to imagine circumstances in which a retreat instruction would not
be reversible error. But just seven days after deciding Rowe, the Court upheld
a murder conviction appealed on exactly such grounds.
Allen v. United States 101 has an unusually tangled history. The defendant,
Alexander Allen, had been convicted, had appealed successfully to the
Supreme Court, 10 2 had then been reconvicted and had again won a new trial
in the Supreme Court.' 0

3

Allen was a "colored boy, of about fourteen years

t0 4
of age," who had killed an eighteen-year-old white named Philip Henson.
The two had taken part the day before in what seems to have been a racial
incident. Henson's companions testified that Allen, encountering Henson the
next day, had crossed a wire fence, holding a pistol, struck Henson with his
hands, and then shot him twice. Allen and his friend testified that Henson
attacked Allen, knocked him to the ground, and began beating him with a
stick. Footprints in the soft ground seemed to support the whites' version of
events. 105
Allen was now appealing his third conviction-this time on grounds,
among others, that the trial court had instructed the jury that he was
permitted to kill in self-defense "[p]rovided he use all the means in his power

97. Id at 554. This rewriting of the facts, see part IV.A.1, represents a kind of interpretive
double whammy: Bozeman's purely verbal insult is redefined as a "real provocation," while Rowe's
physical assault-the first in the confrontation-is transformed into something not "violent or
dangerous" at all, but merely the expression of an idea.
98. Id at 557. This manipulation of time is an example of stopping the clock. See part IV.A.3.
99. 162 US at 557 (citations omitted).
100. Id at 558.
101. 164 US 492 (1896) (Allen III).
102. Allen v United States, 150 US 551 (1893) (Allen I).
103. Allen v United States, 157 US 675 (1895) (Allen II).
104. Allen 1, 150 US at 551.
105. Id.
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otherwise to save his own life or prevent the intended harm, such as retreating
as far as he can .
"...
106
The same court that had decided Rowe now asserted that it had never
changed the common-law rule of retreat:
Nor is there anything in the instruction of the court that the prisoner was bound to
retreat as far as he could before slaying his assailant that conflicts with the ruling of
this court in Beardv. U.S. So, too, in the case ofAlberty v. U.S., the defendant found the

deceased trying to obtain access to his wife's chamber through a window, in the
nighttime, and it was held that he might repel the attempt by force, and was under no
obligation to retreat if the deceased attacked him with a knife. 1Thegeneral
duty to retreat,
07
instead of killing, when attacked, was not touched upon in these cases.

It would be difficult to find a clearer example of the elasticity of legal
"rules" than this bland manipulation of the Beard holding by the same court
that decided it to fit four very different set of facts. The reasons for the
Court's acrobatics are not entirely clear. Certainly it would be
understandable if, after three juries had found Allen guilty, the justices simply
wished to be rid of his case. In addition, Allen's version of events, which is the
only one by which the right to stand his ground might have been suggested,
was contradicted by the physical evidence of the footprints in the field.' 0 8
It is also suggestive to consider the killer-victim racial lineup of the four
cases: in Beard, both were white; in Alberty, both were black; in Rowe, the killer
was an Indian, the victim a white who had insulted the killer by calling him
black. In Allen, by contrast, the killer was black, the victim white.
After Allen, the flow of self-defense cases from Indian Territory dried
up. 1 9 But the Court later offered another, subtly different formulation by
Justice Holmes in 1921, in his famous opinion in Brown v. United States.'I °
Brown and Hermis were U.S. employees who had conducted a lengthy
feud. Hermis had warned Brown that he would kill him. The final
confrontation took place at a building site for a new post office, thus bringing
the offense under the jurisdiction of the federal district court in Texas, where
the killing occurred. Brown had retreated twenty-five yards from Hermis's
attack before he shot him, but apparently shot the second time after Hermis
had fallen. The trial judge instructed the jury that "the party assaulted is
always under the obligation to retreat so long as retreat is open to him,
provided that he can do so without subjecting himself to the danger of death
or great bodily harm.""I i
106. Allen I1, 164 US at 497.
107. Id at 498 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This is an extreme example of flip-flopping
the rule. See part IV.A.4.
108. See, for example, Allen 1, 150 US at 562 (Brewer dissenting).
109. Oklahoma attained statehood in 1907, which gave it the right to try felonies in its own state
courts.
110. 256 US 335 (1921). Richard Maxwell Brown relates Holmes's handling of Brown to the
justice's experiences as a Union soldier during the Civil War. See Brown, .No DutY to Retreat at 30-37
(cited in note 15).
I11.
Brown, 256 US at 342.
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The Court reversed the conviction, citing Beard and Rowe.'" 2 In
elucidating the Beard rule, Holmes uttered one of his more famous passages:
Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.

Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a condition of immunity that one in that
situation should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not think it
possible to fly with safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.' 13

But Holmes gave the Beard rule a new twist: "Rationally the failure to
retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to
determine whether the defendant went farther than he was justified in
doing.""14 In this, he was perhaps only making explicit what the Court had
been saying all along: that in this area there was no rule, neither a rule of
retreat nor of a right to stand one's ground, but only a series of complex and
highly subjective judgments to be made about whether specific fact patternsinvolving the physical movements of the actors, their spoken communications
at the time of the incident, and their prior relationships-justified a finding of
self-defense.
C.

The Doctrine of Retreat in the Alabama and Illinois Courts

As noted above,' '5 Alabama adopted the English common-law retreat rule
early and has remained nominally faithful to it ever since."t 6 Alabama's selfdefense jurisprudence managed to absorb the Supreme Court's decision in
Beard without visible dismay-or, indeed, without seeming to notice that the
nation's highest court had thrown its prestige behind the contrary rule." 17
Two decades after Beard, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a
conviction in a case implicating the "manifest felony" exception to the retreat
rule." 18 Yank Beasley and Ephraim White had ridden together in a wagon for
thirty-five or forty minutes when White arose to leave the wagon. Beasley
testified that when White arose, he "clicked his gun twice, and .

.

. as he got

about three-quarters up he turned his rifle towards defendant.""19 Beasley
then shot White dead. Beasley was sentenced to death after a trial at which
112. Idat 343.
113. Id.
114. Id. This formulation offers "no retreat" courts an invitation to flip-flop the rule. See part
IV.A.4.
115. See note 17 and accompanying text.
116. Interesting Alabama cases applying the English rule during the 19th-century growth of the
American rule include Carroll v State, 23 Ala 28 (1853) (setting forth the "co-tenant" exception to the
"castle doctrine"); De Arman v State, 71 Ala 351 (1882) (law must show "equal regard" for life of
assailant and defendant); Jones v State, 76 Ala 8 (1884) (denying the "co-tenant" exception); and Perry
v State, 94 Ala 25 (1894). The state has retained its "retreat rule" even through the adoption of a
new criminal code. See, for example, Kyser v State, 513 So2d 68 (Ala C App 1987). Richard Maxwell
Brown sees in Alabama's adherence to the rule of retreat the influence of George Washington Stone,
ajustice of the state supreme court for a total of 27 years. Brown, No Duty to Retreat at 20-24 (cited in
note 15).
117. See Blankenship v State, 11 Ala App 125, 65 So 860 (1914) (Beard cited only to show that right
to stand one's ground does not apply unless the defendant did not provoke the assault and did not
enter into mutual combat). Blankenship is apparently the only decision in Alabama case law to take
any notice, however remote, of Beard.
118. Beasley vState, 181 Ala 28, 61 So 259 (1913).
119. Idat 260.
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the judge refused to admit into evidence Beasley's testimony about threats
and previous assaults by White, and further refused an instruction allowing
the jury to find him not guilty if he shot in the belief that he was in "imminent
danger."' 20 The state supreme court denied the validity of the "imminent
danger" instruction because it "pretermits the defendant's duty to retreat,"' 2'
but nonetheless reversed the conviction, arguing that
[i]t may be true that the defendant's testimony was opposed by the great
preponderance of the evidence, and that his version of the action of the deceased may
have been inconsistent with the facts attending the trip from Montgomery to the place
of the killing, both being in the same wagon, and no fuss or cross words passed

between them, yet the undisputed evidence showed that deceased had a rifle across his
lap, the defendant said he heard him cock it, and saw him attempt to change its
position, and at the same time starting to turn upon him; and we think that the trial

court erred in excluding the threats, as well as evidence of a previous difficulty, as it
was a question for the jury as to whether or not this action was sufficient to reasonably
12
indicate immediate danger, and whether or not the defendant could safely retreat.

2

The court thus insisted that it was not changing the requirement of retreat,
while in effect giving a new jury a chance to approve a kind of preemptive
strike. This hair-splitting prompted a concurrence by four judges, who
insisted that the proper holding would be that "if defendant's version that the
deceased was about to make a murderous attack upon him was true, he was
23
under no duty to retreat."'
The Alabama court consistently found it more expedient to change the
retreat rule in order to benefit a sympathetic defendant than to mitigate the
rhetoric with which it defended the rule against unsympathetic ones. Thus, in
Smith v. State, 124 the court reversed the conviction that followed a
disagreement between "two substantial citizens of Winston County" who "fell
out over the failure of the dead man's son to be reelected as a teacher of the
school in the community, of which school the defendant was one of the
Trustees."' 25 During the course of the disagreement, the dead man
struck the defendant over his eye with his fist and had his arm drawn back to strike him
again when the defendant struck him one time with a knife, in a vital place in the neck,
from which wound Drake died .... There was some evidence that after1 26the blow was
struck, Smith did everything he could to try to stop the flow of blood.

The trial court instructed the jury that "it must have been at the time he
committed his act [sic] there was open to him no avenue of escape whereby he
could retreat without increasing his peril."' 12 7 The supreme court reversed
the conviction on the grounds that the instruction "places too great a burden
upon the defendant. The rule is that 'there must have been no other
120. Id at 259.
121. Id at 261.
122. Id at 260.
123. Id at 261. The majority had chosen to rewrite the facts, see part IV.A.I, while the
concurring judges would have used the "murderous attack" language to flip-flop the rule. See part
IV.A.4.
124. 29 Ala App 212, 195 So 290 (1940).
125. Id at 290-91.
126. Idat291.
127. Id at 292.
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reasonably safe mode of escape, by retreat or by avoiding the combat.' [A]
defendant is not required to retreat where to do so would reasonably appear
to increase his peril to life or limb." 12 8 The "imminent danger" to Smith was,
of course, only that of assault. Under either the "manifest felony" or
"murderous intent" doctrines, he would not have been freed of his duty to
retreat. The court thereby interpretively inflated the danger of violence. Just
as words may become blows or blows words, mere blows may thus become,
29
when necessary, deadly force.'
Unlike Alabama, Illinois quickly adopted the Supreme Court's Beard
doctrine. The adoption was painless, as it came in a case, Hammond v.
People,' 30 in which no one was actually hurt or injured.
Hammond was charged with assault with intent to murder his brother-inlaw, Joseph Dixon. The defendant's ex-wife, Dixon's sister, was living with
Dixon and four of her children by Hammond. Hammond, who lived nearby,
was standing outside Dixon's front yard talking to the children when Dixon
emerged from the house and threatened to punch him. After this exchange,
in disputed circumstances, Hammond drew a pistol and fired twice, missing
both times. Police arrested both men.' 3 ' Hammond was convicted after the
trial judge instructed the jury that he could sustain a self-defense plea only if
"a reasonable and prudent man [would have] believe[d] that his life was in
danger, or that he was about to receive great bodily harm, and that he could
not escape therefrom without taking the life of the said Joseph Dixon, or
32
doing him great bodily injury.'
The state supreme court held that the instruction was error:
The ancient doctrine of the common law that the right of self-defense did not arise
until every effort to escape, even to retreating until an impassable wall or something of
that nature had been reached, has been supplanted in America by the doctrine that a
man, if unlawfully assaulted in a place where he has a right to be, and put in danger,
real or reasonably apparent, of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm, is not
required to endeavor to escape from his assailant, but may stand his ground and repel
force with force, even to the taking of the life of his assailant, if necessary, or in good
reason apparently necessary, for the preservation or his own life, or to protect himself
from receiving great bodily harm [citing Beard, inter alia] ....

It is not necessary to

the right of self-defense that the party having otherwise
the right to exercise it cannot
"escape" the danger by fleeing from an assailant. 133

The court omitted the customary language about freedom from fault,
perhaps because, this being a classic chance-medley situation, it would have
been difficult to imagine Hammond exercising any right that depended on his
being faultless.
128. Id (citation omitted).
129. The court inflates the danger of violence by rewriting the facts, see part IV.A. 1, and reduces
the threshold of danger needed to make deadly force acceptable, thus flip-flopping the rule. See part
IV.A.4.
130. 199 Il1 173, 64 NE 980 (1902).
131. Idat981.
132. Id at 983.
133. Id, citing Beard, 158 US 550, among other authorities.
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Nonetheless, the enunciation in Hammond has remained Illinois law ever
since. The courts preserve the rule while reaching different results either by
rewriting the facts, 134 or by flip-flopping the rule, reinserting the fault
standard when necessary, or even penalizing unsympathetic defendants for
failing to retreat.35
The court rewrote the facts to benefit John Williams, a cab driver who shot
from his cab and killed a sixteen-year-old boy on a Chicago street in 1963.136
Williams was driving by a traffic light when, he later testified, he saw a group
of youths beating an old man. When he shouted to them to stop, someone
threw a brick at his cab. Williams shot twice, and one of his bullets lodged in
Kenneth Boatner's brain, killing him. Williams then drove away without
attempting to aid Boatner or the mugging victim, and denied all knowledge of
the incident when originally questioned by the police. When he finally
admitted the incident, Williams' statement showed the traces of the kind of
editing necessary to make it fit into an official story: " 'Well, [the muggers]
were just standing-well, they started toward me.' "137
The evidence in this case did not fit neatly into an official story. Williams
intervened to help a crime victim; but his shots were apparently fired after the
muggers had left the victim alone. The court dealt with this by noting that
"the gang could have returned and further assaulted the victim after
defendant left."' 3 8 In addition, Johnson himself was in no real danger, as he
could have driven away. The court created an imminent danger to Johnson by
expanding the time frame-" [d]efendant had been robbed several weeks
before the incident"' 39-and imagining what might have happened if the facts
had been different-"[h]is cab was hit by a brick ....

It is apparent that the

throwing of bricks at defendant could have caused death or great bodily harm
if defendant was struck by one of them"' 4 0 -even though the defendant was
inside the cab and thus unlikely to be hit directly at all.
The case could be seen as one of a panicky, violent man who fired a gun at
random on the street, without quite knowing why and without trying to take
responsibility for the fact. But the court recharacterized the facts to fit a
different official story-the story of the Good Samaritan:
The State contends that defendant could have driven away from the scene of the
incident with his cab and thus the use of force was unnecessary. We disagree with this
contention. When a defendant is where he has a lawful right to be, he has a right to
stand his ground, and if reasonably apprehensive of injury is justified in taking the
assailant's life. [citations omitted] Defendant was under no duty to flee. Furthermore,
defendant testified that he had not left the area, because of his desire to help the
victim of the assault, Joseph Bell. 114 1 1 We will take judicial notice of the fact, that
134. See part IV.A.I.
135. See part IV.A.4.
136. People v IillUiams, 56 11 App 2d 159, 205 NE2d 749 (1965).
137. Id at 752.
138. Id at 753.
139. Id at 754. This is an example of stopping the clock, see part IV.A.3., and of mind-reading,
see part IV.A.2.
140. 205 NE2d at 754. This is an example of rewriting the facts. See part IV.A.I.
141. He did leave the scene of the injury without further helping Bell.
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recently there have been a number of publicized assaults and homicides, in which the
victims called upon their fellow citizens to render aid. In many instances these fellow
citizens refused to get involved. Here we have a man who took it upon himself to get
involved, when a victim called for help.[1 42 1 In addition to the cases cited above,
public policy forbids us to say a person must leave the victim of a brutal beating lie on
the street when called44 upon to render aid. [ 14 3 1 A citizen must feel free to help the
victim of an assault.'

A remarkable pair of opinions by the appellate court illustrates the fine

interpretive parsing of facts that goes into determining whether a defendant is
entitled to the "right" to stand his or her ground. Louis Pirovolos appealed
his conviction of voluntary manslaughter.14 5 Pirovolos was an upholsterer
who killed a fellow employee during an argument at a work site in the balcony

of a Chicago theater. Pirovolos, a highly unsympathetic defendant, swore at
the victim, then attempted to tell him how to do his job. The deceased replied
6
that Pirovolos was "not the boss," at which Pirovolos left the room. 1 4 When
he returned, he held out a knife and challenged the deceased. The two men
scuffled, the deceased attacking with a small carpenter's knife and the back of

a chair, the defendant striking back with a knife. Pirovolos was convicted in a
bench trial:
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court made a finding that the deceased had
made a certain assault on defendant, and that defendant was justified in the use of
some force, but that his use of deadly force was unjustified. The trial court also found
that defendant was in the process of retreating, but had the opportunity to retreat
further. 147

The appellate court refused to set aside the conviction:
There was ample evidence that defendant aggressively initiated the conflict, was the
first to arm himself, and retreated only after deceased emerged from the room in
[Ilt should also be noted that the record bears out the trial
which he was working ....
court's finding that defendant had an48opportunity to retreat completely from the area
without delivering the fatal wound. 1

Eight months later, however, the Appellate court heard facts that changed
its mind.' 4 9 After Pirovolos's conviction, his wife located a different
eyewitness, who testified in a hearing on Pirovolos's motion for a new trial.
The new witness testified that "[the] deceased 'came at' defendant with a
knife, and defendant blocked the blow. Defendant swung his knife, and the
deceased went down."15 0 This new testimony could have altered the verdict,
the court held:
[Previous] testimony did not indicate that the deceased used the knife or that he
intended to use it in the altercation. However the testimony of Durand was that the
deceased did, in fact, swing at defendant with the knife and that defendant then
142. Williams' willingness to get involved did not extend to furnishing first aid, calling the police,
or telling a truthful story when finally questioned.
143. Williams did drive away, leaving the victim lying on the street.
144. WI1illiams, 205 NE2d at 753 (citations omitted).
145. People v Pirovolos, 116 I11App 2d 73, 253 NE2d 481 (1969).
146. Id at 482.
147. Id.
148. Id at 483. This is a classic example of flip-flopping the rule. See part IV.A.4.
149. People v Pirovolos, 126 Il1 App 2d 361, 261 NE2d 701 (1970) (Supplementary opinion).
150. Id at 702.
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returned the blow .... Defendant's theory was that he was acting in self-defense. The
of that given by defendant, and
additional testimony of Durand was corroborative
15 1
could have changed the result of the trial.

Note here the shift from broad to narrow time-framing: Pirovolos's
actions in arming himself and provoking the confrontation become less
important. 15 2 Accordingly, Pirovolos was given a new trial, even though the
new testimony changed only slightly the facts indicating that he could have
retreated if he wanted to.
A similar exception to the rule of "no retreat" was found for Jesse De
Savieu, who shot Raymond Johnson after Johnson threw him onto the tracks
at the 35th Street "L" station in Chicago. 5 3 DeSavieu testified that Johnson
threw him onto the tracks and refused to let him climb onto the platform
when a train approached. "[T]he electrified third rail and the traffic-filled Dan
Ryan Expressway were behind him."' 154 Other witnesses disagreed about
whetherJohnson had explicitly told DeSavieu he would not let him climb back
onto the platform. Johnson was convicted of murder after the prosecution
argued that "shooting Johnson from the 'L' tracks was not necessary because
defendant failed to use available means of escape."' 15 5 The court disagreed
that these arguments implied a duty to retreat:
It appears that the prosecutor's arguments were directed toward the factual issue of
whether, in the light of defendant's options, which included climbing up a nearby

to shoot Johnson in
ladder or taking shelter under the platform edge, it was necessary
1 56
order to remove himself from the path of an oncoming train.

Here the duty to retreat has simply been smuggled back into the law under
the guise of an aspect of necessity. Desavieu was required to make a
sophisticated calculation in the path of an oncoming train; because he had not
57
made it properly, his conviction was affirmed.'
V
CONCLUSION

It would certainly be defensible to use the retreat cases as evidence for the
proposition, advanced by legal realists, that courts do not use rules to decide
cases, but simply to rationalize their own intuitive decisions; 158 and by critical
legal scholars, that "the law" as a construct is inherently incoherent, selfcontradictory, and unprincipled, 59 and that criminal-law rules cannot be
drawn in a way that would successfully prevent courts from using their
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
This is an example of stopping the clock. See part IV.A.3.
People v DeSavzeu, 120 Il1 App 3d 420, 458 NE2d 504 (1983).
Id at 508.
Id at 513.
Id.
Id at 514. This is an example of flip-flopping the rule. See part IV.A.4.

158.

On legal realist theory about courts' use of rules, see, for example, Laura Kalman, Legal

Realism at Yale: 1927-1960, 4-7 (U North Carolina Press, 1986); see also Joseph William Singer, Legal
Realism .Vow, 76 Cal L Rev 465, 470 (1988).
159.

See, for example, Kelman, 33 Stan L Rev at 671-72 (cited in note 15).
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interpretive discretion to achieve results actually determined by class, race, or
sexual bias.
However, the mental discipline involved in imagining both improvements
to the current rules and, more ambitiously, new rules that might replace them
is useful for two reasons. First, an inquiry into contemporary self-defense law
is by its nature an investigation of the actual values contained within the
contemporary criminal law. By imagining rules that attempt to capture values
we wish to promote, we can see more clearly how the current law promotes
values its practitioners may not fully acknowledge or comprehend.
Second, the bases of the criminal law are desperately in need of
reformulation to meet the needs of contemporary society. Much criminal
doctrine remains grounded in largely obsolete nineteenth-century notions of
free will and individualism. Legal analysis uses rights theory to analyze
interactions between persons who are members of a social context and for
whom largely unconscious reciprocal relationships are often more important
determinants of behavior than are rational calculations about rights. Ideas
and attitudes formulated during the sparsely populated, heavily rural,
expanding frontier culture of nineteenth century America serve badly a
crowded, multiracial, technological, urbanized society trembling on the lip of
the twenty-first century. One of the chief needs of the evolving society of the
United States is a reduction in the use of violence, whether expressed as
crime, unprincipled law enforcement and corrections, or war and militarism.
The law need not necessarily play a passive rule in the attempt to wean our
society from its uniquely violent mores; it could be used to restrict the
tolerance and use of violence by all levels of society.
The law of self-defense is a logical place to begin this inquiry because
contemporary thinkers tend to see the area of self-defense as one in which the
general rules against violence simply do not apply. 160 But if, as this note
suggests, cases of "self-defense" represent a fragile, socially mediated
interpretive construct, a determined effort to bring them more closely within a
general proscription of violence might serve the purpose of awakening legal
thinkers to the ways we use such "exceptions" to negate the rules we claim to
live by.
Accordingly, I close with a few suggestions for change in the self-defense
area. These are intended, at least at present, more as "thought experiments"
than as formal proposals for statutory reform.
(1) The most modest of the suggestions are intended to make the
administration of the existing rules more consistent and comprehensible.
They do not necessarily move the law in a less violent direction, but if
properly drawn they might at least make its regulatory strictures on the use of
violence clearer.
(a) "Retreat" jurisdictions should restrict the "imminent danger"
exception to cases involving the actual or apparent display of a deadly weapon
160.

See note I and accompanying text.
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and a real or implied threat to use it. The "imminent danger" exception
should not be used to justify killing in retreat jurisdictions where the
defendant is sympathetic but faced nothing more dangerous than a punch in
the eye. The courts might limit the elasticity of this exception by holding that,
as a matter of law, it cannot arise unless the victim displayed a deadly weapon
or acted in such a way that a reasonable person would have believed the victim
had a deadly weapon, and either threatened to use it or behaved in such a way
that a reasonable defendant would have believed the victim was about to use
it. Obviously this restriction leaves a large area for interpretation, but it might
inhibit courts from voiding the retreat rule entirely for "substantial citizens"
or others they wish to favor.
(b) "No retreat" jurisdictions should replace the "without fault" rule with
the "no first assault" rule in all cases. Courts in retreat jurisdictions are
presently free to phrase the prerequisite for the right to stand either as a
requirement that the defendant must be "without fault" in bringing about the
fatal confrontation or that the defendant must simply not make the initial
assault. These two variations can lead to different results, as an actual assault
can be interpreted as not embodying fault, or mere words can be interpreted
as if they were assaults. If "no retreat" jurisdictions were to require courts to
ask whether the defendant physically began the encounter by touching or
striking the victim or threatening the victim with a weapon, and to exclude
evidence of insulting or provocative words as potential justifications for an
initial assault, the area of indeterminacy in these cases might be reduced.
(c) "No retreat" jurisdictions should not smuggle the "retreat rule" into
specific cases under the guise of "lack of necessity." A rule of "no retreat"
represents a policy determination by courts or legislatures about the kind of
behavior that will benefit society as a whole. I believe the policy embodied in
the rule to be deeply flawed; but once the courts have enunciated it, the right
to stand should not be officially extended to all citizens and then withdrawn
sub silentio from those the courts find unsympathetic. Accordingly, statutes
and case law in "no retreat" jurisdictions might define necessity as consisting
of two elements only: (i) imminence of attack and (ii) danger of death or
serious bodily harm. If both are present, the question of retreat would not
arise.
(2) It is also possible to imagine more sweeping reforms to the current law
that might more successfully embody a general policy against the use of
violence.
(a) The rule of retreat could be replaced by an "avoidance of violence"
standard. The problem with the idea of "retreat" is that it can direct the
attention of the courts to the physical movements of the defendant and the
victim in the seconds before the killing. A contemporary replacement might
suggest that the right of self-defense does not arise unless the trier of fact,
considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, concludes that the
defendant made reasonable affirmative efforts to avoid the need for deadly
force. Actual physical retreat might be one such effort; but a defendant who
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created or escalated a violent encounter would not be adjudged not guilty for
the sole reason that he or she physically retreated after the confrontation
turned violent, nor would a defendant who attempted to defuse a
confrontation be penalized simply because in the process he or she did not
retreat or actually advanced. The standard should explicitly mandate the use
of a broad time frame and a broad view of intent-hence the language about
"all facts and circumstances."
(b) The distinction between justification and excuse, and therefore the
interpretive analysis of chance-medley, could be revived. To use the
distinction in contemporary jurisprudence, justifiable homicide might be
defined as covering those cases (i) where the victim was unknown to the
defendant and the victim began the assault in circumstances that would
convince a reasonable person in the defendant's situation that the victim
intended to rob, murder, physically harm, or rape the defendant or (ii) where
the assailant was known to the defendant but began the assault without
previous interaction between them on the occasion in question under
circumstances that would suggest that the victim intended robbery, murder,
physical harm, or rape. Excusable homicide would cover all cases in which the
assault began after interaction between the two parties.
The implications of this change are potentially quite wrenching, as they
would require or at least imply a finding of legal fault on the part of
defendants we are used to regarding as faultless. The most morally
troublesome, from a contemporary perspective, would be the case of a woman
attacked by a man in a "date rape" situation, or of a wife attacked by her
husband after a long interaction between them from which she had at least
theoretically the ability to withdraw. The new law of excuse would not
necessarily punish such a defendant, but it would fit her actions into a
different official story: I may have made errors in judgment during the events
preceding the assault, but once the assault began, those errors became
irrelevant; I had no choice but to kill. Such an interpretive change might
work injustice (not all of those assaulted after interaction have in any sense
contributed to the assault); but it might also permit the law to take a more
honest attitude toward the actions of defendants who use force in self-defense
against those with whom they have ambiguous prior relationships, and
prevent the distortion involved in requiring that such defendants pretend to
have been completely faultless inthe encounter that led to the killing.' 6 '
161. One of the most repugnant characteristics of contemporary rape cases where the rapist is a
person known to the victim (and thus of cases where a victim or potential victim of rape uses violence
in self-defense) is an unspoken standard, enforced by legal arguments and believed by juries, of
something like "contributory negligence" as negating the rapist's culpability (or voiding the victim's
right to self-defense). See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L J 1087, 1173-74 (1986). Much
argumentation in rape cases that I have observed is directed to proving that the victim was
completely faultless in entering the situation in which the attack occurred, or conversely, that she was
guilty of something, even if only an error ofjudgment. A "mixed fault" standard might require the
jury to separate the defendant's "contributory negligence" from the actions that required her to use
force in self-defense.
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(3) Finally, and most radically, the very idea of self-defense could be
changed or negated altogether. Few things are more strange and threatening
to the contemporary mind than a suggestion that the law should withdraw
recognition of the "right" to use violence in any circumstances, even those
historically recognized as self-defense. Self-defense is seen as a natural right,
one that arises independently of the social context in which it is exercised and
that can be recognized easily without reference to that context. I believe that
what we call self-defense is in fact socially constructed and created by those
who, after the fact, interpret events. And it is arguable that for every occasion
on which the right of self-defense is invoked by a wronged party who has
successfully resisted an aggressor, it is invoked at least once by an aggressive
party seeking to justify unprovoked violence. Few aggressive wars are ever
begun without a solemn declaration that the aggressor is defending itself
against the weaker party;' 6 2 in daily life, few violent acts are undertaken in
which the aggressor does not claim, and usually believe, that he or she was in
some sense acting in self-defense. A world without a concept of permissible
violent self-defense-in which all acts of violence are seen as culpable to some
degree-is difficult to imagine. I have not successfully imagined it; I cannot
confidently argue that it would be better or less violent than the world we
currently live in. But contemporary ethical theories, and the traditions
bequeathed to us by all the major world religions, uniformly reveal a deep
ambivalence about the use of force in self-defense. The Judeo-Christian
tradition is often unable to choose between "an eye for an eye" and "turn the
other cheek." It might be useful to imagine what the law would be like if it
began turning more cheeks and plucking fewer eyes.

162. In the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein justified his invasion of Kuwait on
the grounds that Kuwait, by allegedly pumping oil from a disputed oil field on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti
border and selling oil at a price lower than that at which he wanted to sell, had commenced
"economic warfare" against Iraq, which Iraq was justified in resisting by military force. "Some of the
Gulf states, [Hussein] said, were keeping the price of oil too low by pumping too much of it. Since
every dollar off the price of a barrel cost Iraq $1 billion a year in lost revenues, this was an 'economic
war' on Iraq ....
[In a note to the Arab League,] Iraq accused Kuwait of planting military posts
inside Iraq and stealing from an Iraqi oilfield. Both Kuwait and the U[nited] A[rab] E[mirates] were
indeed, said the note, part of an 'imperialist-Zionist plot against the Arab nation.' " Kuwait: How the
West Blundered, The Economist (Sept 29, 1990), reprinted in Micah L. Sifry & Christopher Cerf, eds,
The Gulf War Reader 99, 103, 104 (Times Books, 1991). Saddam told the American ambassador to
Iraq that "some brothers are fighting an economic war against us. And... not all wars use weapons
and we regard this war as a military action against us." The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S.
Ambassador, reprinted in The Gulf War Reader at 122, 131 (cited in this note). After the invasion, the
United States then justified its organization and leadership of a multinational force that devastated
Iraq on the grounds, inter alia, that Iraq represented an economic and military threat to the West.
"Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its
economic independence." George Bush, In Defense of Saudi Arabia (Speech of Aug 8, 1990), reprinted
in The Gulf fiar Reader at 197, 198 (cited in this note). "While the world waited, Saddam sought to
add to the chemical weapons he now possesses, an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass
destruction-a nuclear weapon." George Bush, The Liberation of Kuwait Has Begun, (Speech ofJan 16,
1991), reprinted in The Gulf War Reader at 311, 312 (cited in this note).

